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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection in the South on innovation, skills choice, wage inequality and patterns of 
production based on a North-South general-equilibrium model with foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and international outsourcing. We find that stronger IPR protection 
in the South raises the extent of outsourcing and reduces the extent of FDI. This raises 
the proportion of Southerners being unskilled and mitigates wage inequality in the 
South. In the North, stronger Southern IPR protection raises the proportion of 
Northerners being skilled and wage inequality. The effects of international 
specialization, R&D cost and Northern population are also examined. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
It is quite obvious that foreign direct investment (FDI) and international outsourcing are 
now very common on a global scale. When considering the production of part of their 
goods abroad as a means of saving costs, firms can produce goods abroad either 
through multinationals or by licensing foreign firms to produce them on their behalf. 
Over the years, these phenomena have led to economists devoting considerable interest 
in the causes and effects of international specialization.1  
In this paper, we examine the effects of global production on innovation, wage 
inequality and patterns of production based on a North-South product-cycle 
general-equilibrium model, within which final-good producers are based in the North, 
but the firms can choose either to carry out the entire production of the goods in the 
North or to allow the goods to be produced in the South (a foreign country) through 
FDI or international outsourcing. The North-South product-cycle model was originally 
introduced by Vernon (1966) and subsequently extended by Segerstrom et al. (1990) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b), with the literature relating to this model 
essentially following two major lines of research. The first research line focuses on the 
examination of the impact of FDI on imitation activity in developing countries 
(Helpman, 1993; Lai, 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002); the second research line 
investigates the effects of increased international outsourcing of production on 
innovation, wages and patterns of production (Glass and Saggi, 2001).2 Thus, in prior 
studies where the product-cycle model is adopted, there has clearly been a tendency to 
study FDI and international outsourcing activities as separate issues, thereby ignoring 
                                                 
1  Grossman and Helpman (2003) investigate the trade-off between FDI and outsourcing based on the 
assumption that final-good producers can manufacture the goods by themselves or through specific 
investment governed by imperfect contracts. Antras and Helpman (2004) go on to develop a model 
within which firms can choose between engaging in FDI or domestic/international outsourcing based on 
a model with heterogeneous firms. 
2  One of the earlier theoretical studies of the effects of outsourcing is provided by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996a) who assume that the final goods are produced from a continuum of intermediate goods 
using different proportions of skilled and unskilled workers. 
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the fact that firms can choose to undertake their production in foreign countries based 
on both FDI and outsourcing.  
In this study, we allow firms to choose between FDI and outsourcing when 
carrying out production in the South. There are two major differences between FDI 
and outsourcing strategies. First, conducting FDI activity incurs higher governance 
costs (Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Helpman, 2003).3 A Northern firm needs to 
recruit Southern skilled workers to manage or monitor its production process in the 
South. Second, Lai et al. (2009) argue that the major disadvantage of outsourcing is the 
possibility of the leakage of production secrets due to the incompleteness of contracts. 
Without properly managing or monitoring its production process in the South and 
given that outsourcing is plagued with contractual difficulties in the absence of perfect 
contracting, outsourcing is subject to the risk of imitation.4 However, the risk of 
imitation will be reduced if intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South is 
strengthened.5  
The other feature which distinguishes this paper from the extant literature is that 
we allow for the heterogeneity among the agents by endogenizing skills choice. All 
Northerners are assumed to be skilled and work in the R&D sector or production 
sector, whereas Southerners can choose to either remain unskilled or become skilled. 
Unskilled Southerners work in the production sector while skilled Southerners work in 
the FDI sector. The heterogeneity of Southerners allows us to study the effects of 
strengthening IPR protection and global production on wage inequality in the South 
                                                 
3  Tomiura (2007) finds that firms involving in FDI activity are more productive than foreign 
outsourcers based on the firm-level data of 118,300 firms across all manufacturing industries in Japan. 
Although FDI requires higher fixed entry costs, it brings in higher gross profits for firms. 
4  The 2003 survey of the Shared Services and Business Process Outsourcing Association (SBPOA) 
reports that 33% of respondents agree that a lack of control and loss of internal knowledge are the main 
concerns when making an outsourcing decision. 
5  Previous literature examining the effects of stronger Southern IPR protection also tends to separate 
FDI and outsourcing activities. The impact of strengthening IPR protection on FDI decision is studied 
by Lai (1998), Glass and Saggi (2002), Glass and Wu (2007) and Parello (2008) while its effect on 
outsourcing decision is examined by Yang and Maskus (2001) and Glass (2004).  
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and the international wage dispersion of skilled workers.6  
We find that stronger Southern IPR protection increases the extents of 
outsourcing and Southern production while reducing the extents of FDI and Northern 
production. Our result outlining the reduced extent of FDI caused by stronger Southern 
IPR protection is different from Lai (1998) and Glass and Wu (2007) who show that 
stronger IPR protection will increase the extent of FDI. In addition, the result of the 
lower extent of Northern production is also different from Glass and Saggi (2002) and 
Parello (2008) who demonstrate that stronger Southern IPR protection will raise the 
extent of Northern production.7 This is because by assuming that firms only engage in 
Northern production and FDI (outsourcing) strategy, previous studies are not able to 
detect the behavior that firms will switch between FDI and outsourcing strategies 
when there is an increased Southern IPR protection. 
We also examine the effects of international specialization, the cost of R&D and 
Northern population. We find that increasing incentives for outsourcing (such as the 
lower labor intensity for outsourcing) will increase the extent of outsourcing and the 
demand for unskilled Southerners, thereby reducing the proportion of Southerners 
becoming skilled and the extent of FDI. Similar effects will be caused by a reduction 
in the cost of R&D. On the other hand, increasing incentives for FDI (such as the 
lower labor intensity for FDI) will cause reversed effects on the proportion of 
Southerners being skilled and the extents of FDI and outsourcing. 
In order to address the issue about the effects on the Northern wage inequality, we 
then consider an economy with heterogeneous Northerners. Our results show that 
those changes inducing greater demand for Southern unskilled workers (such as 
                                                 
6  The heterogeneity of workers is also assumed by Lai (1995) in an examination of the effects of the 
labor supply on the global distribution of income.  
7  We also find that stronger Southern IPR protection will raise the R&D difficulty and this result is 
different from Parello (2008) who finds that strengthening IPR protection will reduce the R&D 
difficulty due to lower R&D employment.  
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stronger Southern IPR protection) will raise wage inequality in the North and reduce 
wage inequality in the South, along with an increase in the international wage 
dispersion of skilled workers. On the other hand, changes inducing a reduction in cost 
of FDI, which increases the extent of FDI and the demand for Southern skilled workers, 
will cause reversed effects on the Northern and Southern wage inequalities, ultimately 
lowering the international wage dispersion of skilled workers. 
Section 2 develops the model and determines the balanced-growth-path (BGP) 
equilibrium. Section 3 examines how strengthening IPR protection, international 
specialization, cost of R&D and Northern population affect innovation, skills choice, 
wages and patterns of production. An economy with heterogeneous Northerners is 
considered in Section 4. The final section concludes.  
2.  THE MODEL 
We begin with a description of a product-cycle model with endogenous innovation and 
skills (human capital) accumulation in the spirit of Romer (1990), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991a, 1991b) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999). In our model, there 
exist a developed Northern country (N) and a developing Southern country (S). Within 
each country, ݅ ൌ ሼܰ, ܵሽ, the economy is comprised of ܮ௜ሺݐሻ households at time t. 
Given the birth rate, ߠ, and the death rate, δ, in both countries, the growth rate of the 
population, g, is equal to ሺߠ െ ߜሻ. Assuming that the lifespan of each individual is T, 
the population dynamics imply that that ߠܮ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ߜܮ௜ሺݐ ൅ ܶሻ  and ܮ௜ሺݐ ൅ ܶሻ ൌ
ܮ௜ሺݐሻ݁௚்.8 This indicates that the number of births at time t equals the number of 
deaths at time t+T. Thus, we can express ߠ ൌ ௚௘೒೅௘೒೅ିଵ and ߜ ൌ
௚
௘೒೅ିଵ.  
2.1. Consumers  
                                                 
8  This implicitly assumes that for ݐ ൏ ܶ, ܮ௜ሺݐሻ includes those who have lived for less than T periods. 
For example, when ݐ ൌ 0, ߰ܮ௜ሺ0ሻ consumers are born and ߜܮ௜ሺ0ሻ consumers die immediately after 
the economy starts. 
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Consumers can choose from a continuum of products z∈[0,1] available at different 
quality levels (j). The quality increment between a quality ‘j’ product and a quality ‘j-1’ 
product is constant and equal to ߣ ൐ 1. Thus, each product of quality j provides 
quality ߣ௝. All products begin at time t=1 with the quality level j=0 and the base 
quality ߣ଴ ൌ 1. 
The representative household in country i is faced with a lifetime utility of:             
 ௜ܷሺ0ሻ ൌ ׬ ܮ௜ሺ0ሻ݁ିሺఘି௚ሻ௧ ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ሺݐሻ ݀ݐ;		ܮ௜ሺ0ሻ ൐ 0; 	ߩ ൐ ݃	,∞଴          (1) 
where ߩ denotes the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility is: 
                    ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ݈݋݃	ሾ∑ ߣ௝ݍ௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ௝ ሿଵ଴ ݀ݖ	,                (2) 
where ݍ௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ is the household consumption in country i for quality level j of 
product z at time t.  
The total expenditure for all products with different quality levels under price 
݌௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ is: 
                 ܧ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ൣ∑ ݌௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻݍ௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ௝ ൧݀ݖ	.ଵ଴                   (3) 
The representative household will maximize the lifetime utility subject to the 
following aggregate intertemporal budget constraint:  
									 ௜ܹሺݐሻ ൅ ܣ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ න ܮ௜ሺ0ሻሾܧ௜ሺݐሻ ൅ ݃ீሿ݁௚ఛ݁ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿ݀߬
∞
௧
,															ሺ4ሻ 
where ௜ܹሺݐሻ denotes the sum of discount wage income of those households from 
country i, ܣ௜ሺݐሻ represents the value of assets that the household holds at time t and 
݃ீ ൒ 0 is a lump-sum tax in every period. The cumulative interest rate, up to time t, is 
given by ܴሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ݎሺ߬ሻ݀߬௧଴ , where ݎሺ߬ሻ is instantaneous interest rate at time ߬. 
The optimization problem can be solved by three steps. In the first step, 
consumers allocate expenditure at each point for each product across available quality 
levels. Based on the utility specification set in Eq. (2), consumers will choose the 
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quality which gives the lowest adjusted price, 
௣ೕሺ೥,೟ሻ
ఒೕ . That is, consumers are willing to 
pay ߣ for a single quality level improvement in a product.  
In the second step, consumers allocate expenditures across products at each point 
in time, and because the elasticity of substitution between any two products is constant 
at unity, expenditure across all products will be the same. Therefore, the global 
demand function for product ݖ  of quality j is ݍ௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ ൌ ܧሺݐሻ/݌௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ , where 
ܧሺݐሻ ൌ ܧேሺݐሻܮேሺݐሻ ൅ ܧௌሺݐሻܮௌሺݐሻ  is the global expenditure at time ݐ . In the 
equilibrium, only the highest quality level available will sell.  
In the final step, consumers allocate lifetime wealth across time by maximizing 
Eq. (1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint in Eq. (4). This yields the 
optimal expenditure path for the representative agent in each country: 
					ܧሶ௜ሺݐሻܧ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݎሺݐሻ െ ߩ	.																																																								ሺ5ሻ 
In order to ensure the existence of the balanced-growth-path equilibrium, we focus on 
a steady state where ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ߩ holds. 
2.2. Skills accumulation 
All Northerners are skilled workers who spend all of their time at work to earn the wage 
rate ݓேு. Agents in the South can choose to remain unskilled and earn the wage rate, 
	ݓௌ௅, which is normalized to 1, or choose the time period (ܦௌ) spent in schools for skills 
training; on completion of their education, they will receive the skilled wage rate		ݓௌு 
per unit of effective labor.  
It is widely accepted within the literature on human capital that important 
determinants of the accumulation of human capital include public investments in 
education and time spent in schools. We therefore consider human capital formation as 
being dependent on these two important determinants. Public educational investment 
 8
is supported by the tax revenue and we assume that government runs a balanced 
budget.9 The total Southern public educational investment in period ݐ is ܩௌሺݐሻ ൌ
݃ீܮௌሺݐሻ. Let ߶ௌ denote the proportion of the unskilled population in the South. The 
remaining ሺ1 െ ߶ௌሻܮௌሺݐሻ individuals either attend schools for skill training or work 
as skilled workers. All skilled Southerners are eligible for public subsidy. Thus, the 
subsidy received by each Southern skilled worker is ݃ௌ ൌ ீೄሺ௧ሻሺଵିథೄሻ௅ೄሺ௧ሻ.
10 
The income of an unskilled worker equals the unskilled wage rate multiplied by 
one unit of unskilled labor while the income of a skilled worker equals the skilled 
wage rate multiplied by one efficiency unit of skilled labor. Thus, individuals choose 
to receive education if: 
																				න ݁ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿ
௧ା்
௧
ݓௌ௅݀߬ ൑ න ݁		ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿݓௌு݄ௌሺܦௌሻ݃ௌఊ݀߬
௧ା்
௧ା஽ೄ
	,														ሺ6ሻ 
where ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the elasticity of skills accumulation with respect to the public 
educational investment. The skills production function of the amount of time spent in 
schools is represented by ݄ௌሺܦௌሻ ൌ ܣௌܦௌఉೄ , where ܣௌ ൐ 0 is the productivity of 
skills production and ߚௌ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the elasticity of human capital accumulation with 
respect to the time spent in schools. Therefore, ݄ௌሺܦௌሻ݃ௌఊ represents one efficiency 
unit of skilled labor.11 
In an equilibrium where skilled and unskilled workers coexist in the South, Eq. (6) 
holds with equality. The optimal time spent in schools ሺܦഥௌሻ is determined by the 
following equation: 
                     ρ݄ௌሺܦഥௌሻ ൌ ൫1 െ ݁ିఘሺ்ି஽ഥೄሻ൯݄ௌᇱ ሺܦഥௌሻ.                  (7) 
                                                 
9  Since Northerners are all skilled workers, we first assume that Northern government does not levy 
tax. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4. 
10  Since human capital depreciates over time, for those Southerners who have started working, the 
public educational subsidy provides on-the-job training for them in order to keep the level of their 
human capital unchanged.  
11  The Cobb-Douglas formation of the human capital accumulation function has been widely used in 
the literature; see, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Chen (2005, 2006). 
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Eq. (7) indicates that ܦഥௌ is dependent on the skill production function ݄ௌሺܦഥௌሻ.  
From Eqs. (6) and (7), wage inequality (measured by the wage of skilled workers 
divided by the wage of unskilled workers) in the South can be expressed as: 
	ݓௌ
ு
ݓௌ௅ ൌ ݓௌ
ு ൌ ߪௌሺܦഥௌሻሺ1 െ ߶ௌሻ
ఊ
݄ௌሺܦഥௌሻ݃ீఊ 		,																																													ሺ8ሻ 
where ߪௌሺܦഥௌሻ ൌ ଵି௘
షഐ೅
௘షഐವഥೄି௘షഐ೅ ൐ 1.  
The supply of unskilled labor (ܮௌ௅) is: 
													ܮௌ௅ሺݐሻ ൌ ߶ௌܮௌሺݐሻ	.																																																											ሺ9ሻ 
In the subpopulation of Southerners who choose to become skilled, the working 
agents are those born between period ሺݐ െ ܶሻ and ሺݐ െ ܦഥௌሻ: 
׬ ߠ௧ି஽ഥೄ௧ି் ሺ1 െ ߶ௌሻܮௌሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߶ௌሻܤௌሺܦഥௌሻܮௌሺݐሻ, 
where ܤௌሺܦഥௌሻ ൌ ൫݁௚ሺ்ି஽ഥೄሻ െ 1൯/ሺ݁௚் െ 1ሻ ൏ 1. Then the supply of effective skilled 
Southern labor (ܮௌு) is:	
                          ܮௌுሺݐሻ ൌ ߰ௌܮௌሺݐሻ	,			                         (10) 
	where ߰ௌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߶ௌሻܤௌሺܦഥௌሻ݄ௌሺܦഥௌሻ݃ௌఊ ൌ ܤௌሺܦഥௌሻ݄ௌሺܦഥௌሻ݃ீఊሺ1 െ ߶ௌሻଵିఊ. 
2.3. Producers 
Innovation occurs only in the North. Northern firms engage in R&D activity and 
produce cutting-edge quality products through innovation. A Northern firm in industry 
ݖ which is engaged in innovation intensity ߡோሺݖ, ݐሻ, for a time interval, ݀ݐ, will 
achieve one level of quality improvement in the final product, with probability 
ߡோሺݖ, ݐሻ݀ݐ. In order to achieve this, ܽோߡோሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ units of labor will be required at 
a total cost of 	ݓேுܽோߡோሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ, where ߕሺݐሻ denotes R&D difficulty. Based on 
the semi-endogenous growth approach, as proposed by Segerstrom (1998), we assume 
that R&D difficulty grows in line with innovation intensity. 12  That is, ௑ሶ ሺ௧ሻఄሺ௧ሻ ൌ
                                                 
12  This is referred as the temporary effects on growth approach in Segerstrom (1998). 
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ߦߡோሺݐሻ	with	0 ൏ ߦ ൏ 1 , wherein this assumption takes into account the concept 
whereby innovations can be discovered more easily will be achieved earlier in time.  
After succeeding in innovating a higher-level quality product, a Northern firm can 
undertake its production in the North or carry out its production in the South, lowering 
its costs through FDI or outsourcing by hiring unskilled Southern workers to carry out 
this production. Let ݒே denote the expected discounted value of a Northern firm that 
has discovered a new product. A Northern firm will select its research intensity such 
that the expected gains from innovation do not exceed the costs, with equality being 
achieved when innovation occurs with positive intensity: 
                 ݒே ൑ 	ݓேுܽோߕ, 	ߡோ ൐ 0	⟺	ݒே ൌ 	ݓேுܽோߕ	.               (11) 
Previous literature tends to use the hiring costs of Southern labor and Northern 
labor to represent the set-up costs of FDI and outsourcing, respectively.13 The same 
setting is used in this paper. Following Parello (2008), we assume that in order to 
undertake its production in the South through FDI, a Northern firm needs to hire 
skilled Southern workers to manage its production process in the South.14 Engaging in 
FDI intensity ߡிሺݖ, ݐሻ for a time interval, ݀ݐ, will require ܽிߡிሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ units of 
labor at a cost of ݓௌுܽிߡிሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ, with a probability of success of ߡிሺݖ, ݐሻ݀ݐ. Let 
ሺݒி െ ݒேሻ represent capital gains from undertaking production in the South through 
FDI. A Northern firm will choose its FDI intensity such that the expected gains from 
FDI do not exceed the costs, with equality being achieved when FDI occurs with 
positive intensity: 
  ݒி െ ݒே ൑ ݓௌுܽிߕ, ߡி ൐ 0	⟺	ݒி െ ݒே ൌ ݓௌுܽிߕ.          (12) 
                                                 
13  FDI is assumed to require Southern labor in Glass and Saggi (2002) and Parello (2008) while 
outsourcing is assumed to require Northern labor in Glass and Saggi (2001). 
14  Although outsourcing may also incur governance costs, these costs are smaller than those incurred 
by FDI. To simplify the model, we assume that only FDI incurs governance costs. However, one can 
obtain the same results qualitatively by assuming that outsourcing faces with lower governance costs. 
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Althernatively, Northern firms can choose to license Southern firms to carry out 
their production processes on a contractual basis. Following the literature, we assume 
that in order to undertake its production in the South through outsourcing, a Northern 
firm needs to hire some Northern workers to carry out the paperwork involved in 
setting up the contracts. Engaging in outsourcing intensity ߡைሺݖ, ݐሻ for a time interval, 
݀ݐ, will require ܽைߡைሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ units of labor at a cost of ݓேுܽைߡைሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ, 
with a probability of success of ߡைሺݖ, ݐሻ݀ݐ.15 
              ݒை െ ݒே ൑ 	ݓேுܽைߕ, 	ߡை ൐ 0	⟺	ݒை െ ݒே ൌ 	ݓேுܽைߕ	.         (13) 
Eqs. (11) to (13) together imply that along the BGP equilibrium:  
																																												 ሶܺ ሺݐሻߕሺݐሻ ൌ
ݒሶேሺݐሻ
ݒேሺݐሻ ൌ
ݒሶிሺݐሻ
ݒிሺݐሻ ൌ
ݒሶைሺݐሻ
ݒைሺݐሻ ൌ ߦߡோሺݐሻ.																												ሺ14ሻ 
Assume old technologies which designs have been improved are available 
internationally. Thus, Southern firms are able to produce final goods by using old 
technologies. Firms are assumed to confront a Bertrand competition. Since Northern 
firms which produce through the use of state-of-the-art technologies possess a one 
quality level lead over the closest rivals, they will charge the price ݌ ൌ ߣ (and make a 
sale ݍ ൌ ܧ/ߣ) to just prevent their closest rivals from earning positive profits. We 
assume that one unit of labor is needed for one unit of the final product. The cost of 
firms completing the final production in the North is ݓேு. The instantaneous profits 
for them are:16 
																																																												ߨே ൌ ܧ ቆ1 െ 	ݓே
ு
ߣ ቇ.																																																				ሺ15ሻ 
Firms undertaking production in the South (either through FDI or outsourcing) 
can save costs by hiring unskilled Southern workers to produce goods, leading to 
marginal costs of ݓௌ௅ ൌ 1. The instantaneous profits are therefore:  
                                                 
15  It should be noted that our model setting induces that ݓேுܽைܺ ൏ ݓௌுܽிܺ, which implies that the 
paperwork costs involved in outsourcing are less than the management costs involved in FDI. 
16  In order to guarantee a positive profit of ߨே, we need 1 ൏ ݓேு ൏ λ. As we will see later, this 
condition will be guaranteed by Eq. (31). 
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																																																																		ߨ ൌ ܧ ൬1 െ 1ߣ൰.																																																					ሺ16ሻ	 
The reward for successful innovation by a Northern firm is: 
																																																											ݒே 		ൌ ߨேߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோ .																																																		ሺ17ሻ 
The reward for a firm successfully carrying out its production in the South 
through FDI is: 
																																																												ݒி ൌ ߨߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோ .																																																	ሺ18ሻ 
If a Northern firm chooses to outsource in the South, it faces the risk of imitation 
which is denoted by ߝ.17 Thus, the reward for a firm successfully undertaking its 
production in the South through outsourcing is: 
																																																										ݒை ൌ ߨߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோ ൅ ߝ .																																													ሺ19ሻ	
2.4. The BGP equilibrium and factor markets 
As noted earlier, the focus of our analysis is on the BGP equilibrium, along which the 
growth rate in R&D difficulty is equal to the population growth rate. This allows us to 
derive the long-run innovation rate, which is expressed as: 
																																																																								ߡோ ൌ ݃ߦ .																																																															ሺ20ሻ 
Let ݊ே  and ݊ௌ , respectively, denote the proportions of products produced 
completely in the North (the extent of Northern production) and in the South (the 
extent of Southern production). Similarly, let ݊ி and ݊ை respectively represent the 
proportions of the goods for which production is carried out through FDI (the extent of 
FDI) and outsourcing (the extent of outsourcing). The sum of these product measures 
should be one: 
                                                 
17  In order to simplify our analysis, we assume that only outsourcing is subject to an imitation risk. We 
can also assume that there is an imitation risk for a Northern firm which chooses to carry out its 
production in the South through FDI. However, assuming that FDI faces with a lower risk of imitation 
will generate the same results qualitatively.  
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                        ݊ே ൅ ݊ி ൅ ݊ை ൅ ݊ௌ ൌ 1.                       (21) 
Along the BGP equilibrium, the flows into FDI, outsourcing activities and 
Southern production equal the flows out of them: 
                              ߡி݊ே ൌ ߡோ݊ி ,                          (22) 
                            ߡை݊ே ൌ ሺߡோ ൅ ߝሻ݊ை,                       (23) 
                              ε݊ை ൌ ߡோ݊ௌ.                           (24)	
We define two stationary variables as the adjusted level of R&D difficulty, 
ݔ ൌ ܺ ܮௌ⁄ , and the adjusted global expenditure, ܧ෠ ൌ ܧ ܮௌ⁄ . Since Northern labor can 
be used for R&D, outsourcing and production, the labor-market clearing condition for 
the North is: 
																																																		ܽோߡோݔ ൅ ܽைߡைݔ݊ே ൅ ݊ே ܧ
෠
ߣ ൌ
ܮே
ܮௌ .																																							ሺ25ሻ 
We assume that once the product is imitated, the Southern firms are able to carry 
out the entire production and earn zero profits. That is, they charge a price equal to the 
cost of production. The labor-market clearing conditions for the South indicate that: 
																																																																		ܽிߡிݔ݊ே ൌ ߰ௌ,																																																							ሺ26ሻ 
																																																					ሺ݊ி ൅ ݊ை ൅ ߣ݊ௌሻ ܧ
෠
ߣ ൌ ߶ௌ.																																																ሺ27ሻ	
Substituting Eqs. (11)-(13), (15) and (16) into Eqs. (17)-(19), we obtain: 
																																											ܧ෠ ቆ1 െ ݓே
ு
ߣ ቇ ൌ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿݓே
ுܽோݔ,																																	ሺ28ሻ	
																																													ܧ෠ߣ ሺݓே
ு െ 1ሻ ൌ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿݓௌுܽிݔ,																														ሺ29ሻ	
																																																										ܧ෠ߣ ሺݓே
ு െ 1ሻ ൌ ߤݓேுݔ,																																																ሺ30ሻ	
where ߤ ൌ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߡோሿܽை ൅ ߝሺܽை ൅ ܽோሻ. 
The economy is described by Eqs. (7), (8) and (20)-(30) with thirteen variables 
൛	ݓேு,ݓௌு, ܦഥௌ, ߶ௌ, ݔ, ܧ෠, ݊ே, ݊ி,	݊ை, ݊ௌ, ߡோ, ߡி, ߡைൟ. Using Eqs. (28)-(30), we can derive the 
wage rates as: 
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																																																			ݓேு ൌ ߣߤ ൅
ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ
ߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ ൐ 1,																																ሺ31ሻ 
																																																								ݓௌு ൌ ߤሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽி ݓே
ு.																																							ሺ32ሻ 
Eq. (32) implies that the international wage dispersion of skilled workers is:  
																																																						ݓு ൌ ݓே
ு
ݓௌு ൌ
ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽி
ߤ .																																			ሺ33ሻ 
Combining Eqs. (21)-(30), the equilibrium can be reduced to the following two 
equations in ݔ and ݊ௌ: 
																													݊ௌ ൌ
1 െ ߰ௌܽிݔߡோ ൅
ሺߣ െ 1ሻ ቀܽோݔߡோ െ ܮேܮௌ ቁݔሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽ
ߝ ൅ ݅ோߝ െ
ܽைݔߡோሺߡோ ൅ ߝሻሺߣ െ 1ሻߝݔሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽ
,																														ሺ34ሻ 
																												݊ௌ 	ൌ ߝݔሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ൜
߶ௌሺߣ െ 1ሻ
ߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ െ
߰ௌ
ܽிߡோൠ.																						ሺ35ሻ	 
Eqs. (34) and (35) are respectively represented by the NL and SL locus in Figure 1. 
Note that Eq. (34) indicates that ݊ௌ and ݔ are positively correlated while Eq. (35) 
implies that there is a negative relationship between ݊ௌ  and ݔ . As shown in 
Appendix A, there exists a unique BGP equilibrium. Once one derives the solution of 
{ݔ, ݊ௌ}, the remaining endogenous variables can be solved accordingly.  
<Figure 1 is inserted about here> 
3. IPR PROTECTION, FDI AND OUTSOURCING 
In order to attract Northern firms to carry out their production in the South, the South 
can make efforts to improve its economic environment. Strengthening IPR protection 
is one way to attract Northern firms to conduct outsourcing activities. Besides, such 
improvements in the economic environment can be also represented by reductions in 
the labor intensity for outsourcing and the labor intensity for FDI.  
We first examine the effects of stronger IPR protection which lowers the 
imitation risk (ߝ). Due to the complexity of the model, the theoretical analysis of the 
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effects on the patterns of trade may not be able to provide clear results; thus, we resort 
to a numerical analysis and calibrate the parameter values used in the model. For the 
benchmark model, the per capita real GDP growth rate is set at ݃ ൌ 2%. The discount 
factor ߩ ൌ 0.06 is chosen to generate a 6% real interest rate. Following Glass and 
Saggi (2001), we set the one-stage quality improvement at ߣ ൌ 2, and the labor 
intensities for R&D and outsourcing at ܽோ ൌ 2 and ܽை ൌ 1. The labor intensity for 
FDI is set at ܽி ൌ 1.8 to make the extent of Northern production (݊ே) roughly equal 
to 50%.18 The parameter of the growth rate in R&D difficulty (ߦ) is assigned to 0.99 
and the risk of imitation (ߝ) is set to 0.01 in order to generate enough international 
wage dispersion of skilled workers and wage inequality in the South. We normalize the 
initial Northern population to 1 and set the ratio of the Northern population to 
Southern population (ܮே/ܮௌ) to 1, but will allow this ratio to vary to examine its 
impact. 
The skills accumulation depends on the quantity of education (ܦௌ) and the quality 
of education (݃ீ). Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), we assume that each 
agent has a working life of 40 years which is normalized to one in the model (ܶ ൌ 1), 
and an “unskilled” high-school graduate becomes skilled worker by spending 4 years 
in college. Thus, we calibrate ߚௌ ൌ 0.1 to match the value that skilled workers spend 
about 10% of working life on skills training and 90% of working life on work. The 
parameter ܣௌ is set to 1.08 so that less than 5% of Southern workers are skilled 
workers. Compared to the quantity of education, the quality of education has a much 
smaller effect on earnings (Card and Krueger, 1996; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001), so 
we set ߛ ൌ 0.02. Public investment in education (݃ீ) is set at 1.1 which is 36% of 
adjusted global expenditure.  
                                                 
18  We follow Glass and Saggi (2001) to match the extent of Northern production at 50%. 
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Based on our parameterization of the benchmark model, 1.36% of Southern workers 
will spend 8.87% of their time on education in order to become skilled workers. The 
wage rate in the North is 1.43 while the wage rate for skilled workers in the South is 
1.19. Thus, the international wage dispersion of skilled workers is 1.20. The resultant 
adjusted global expenditure is 3.03 and adjusted R&D difficulty is 5.03. The 
respective extents of Northern production, FDI, outsourcing and Southern production 
are 49.56%, 6.27%, 29.55% and 14.63%. The benchmark values are presented in Table 
1, which summarizes the effects of various events on the key macroeconomic variables 
in our model; these events are described in the following sub-sections. 
<Table 1 is inserted about here> 
A reduction in ߝ by 1% raises the extent of outsourcing because outsourcing 
becomes more attractive to firms. There will be a reduction in the extent of FDI as a 
result of an increase in the demand for Southern unskilled production workers. A lower 
imitation risk will reduce the extent of Southern production while a higher extent of 
outsourcing will raise the extent of Southern production. Our numerical results 
indicate that overall, the extent of Southern production will increase. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, a lower ߝ shifts both NL and SL locus upward and results in a higher extent 
of Southern production. The extent of Northern production will decrease while the 
adjusted level of R&D difficulty will increase. Consequently, there will also be a 
reduction (increase) in FDI (outsourcing) intensity to restore the steady-state condition. 
We summarize the results on globalization production decisions as follows. 
Effects of Strengthening Southern IPR Protection on Production. Along the 
balanced-growth path, strengthening IPR protection in the South is in favor of 
outsourcing over FDI. It raises the extents of outsourcing and Southern production 
while reducing the extents of FDI and Northern production.  
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The shift of production to the South will reduce the Northern wage rate. As a result 
of a decrease for the demand of Southern skilled workers, wage inequality in the South 
will be reduced, leading to a rise in the international wage dispersion of skilled workers. 
The lower wage rate for Southern skilled workers will lead to a lower proportion of the 
population in the South becoming skilled. These results are summarized in Proposition 
1.19 
Proposition 1. An increase in IPR protection in the South (or a reduction in the labor 
intensity for outsourcing) reduces the Northern and Southern wage rates for skilled 
workers, raises the North-South wage gap among skilled workers and increases the 
proportion of Southern unskilled workers. 
3.1. Labor intensities for outsourcing and FDI  
A reduction in the labor intensity for outsourcing (ܽைሻ will cause the same effects on 
wage inequality, international wage dispersion of skilled workers and skill choice for 
Southerners as strengthening IPR protection (see Proposition 1). Table 1 also reveals 
that it also causes similar effects on the extents of FDI, outsourcing and Southern 
production, the adjusted level of R&D difficulty as well as FDI and outsourcing 
intensities. However, the extent of Northern production will increase.  
A decrease in ܽி by 1% increases the incentives for FDI, which raises the extent 
of FDI. Both the extents of outsourcing and Southern production will decrease because 
Northern firms will switch from outsourcing strategy to FDI. Overall, the extent of 
Northern production will decrease. The demand for Southern skilled workers becomes 
higher, which in turn, leads to an increase in wage inequality in the South. This 
                                                 
19  Because it is quite easy to prove Propositions 1 and 2 by taking the derivatives of Eqs. (31)-(33) and 
(A4) with respect to ߝ, ܽை and ܽி, we do not provide the proofs in the paper; they are, however, 
available upon request. 
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increase in the Southern wage inequality lowers the international wage dispersion of 
skilled workers. Our findings on wage rates are summarized as follows: 
Proposition 2. A fall in the labor intensity for FDI raises the Southern wage rate for 
skilled workers, reduces the North-South wage gap among skilled workers, and 
increases the proportion of Southern skilled workers. However, it does not affect the 
Northern wage rate.  
3.2. Labor intensity for R&D 
We go on to examine the effects of a reduction in the labor intensity for R&D (ܽோ). A 
decrease in ܽோ increases the incentives for R&D activity and raises the adjusted level 
of R&D difficulty. The lower labor intensity for R&D raises the extents of Northern 
production and outsourcing since more Northern labor is available for Northern 
production and outsourcing. The increase in the demand for Northern labor leads to a 
rise in the Northern wage rate. There will be a resultant increase in the demand for 
unskilled Southerners, which lowers wage inequality in the South and increases the 
international wage dispersion of skilled workers. With a decrease in the proportion of 
skilled Southerners, the extent of FDI will decrease.  
3.3. Labor supply 
Finally, we investigate the impact of a decrease in the Northern population (ܮே). 
Because Northern labor supply does not directly affect the incentives for innovations, 
FDI and outsourcing, the wage rates in both the North and the South are unaffected. 
Thus, there is also no change in the international wage dispersion of skilled workers. 
With no change in the incentives for skills accumulation, the proportion of skilled 
Southerners remains the same. Nevertheless, a reduction in the Northern labor supply 
implies that less labor can be devoted to innovation and production in the North. This 
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will lead to a reduction in the adjusted level of R&D difficulty, a smaller extent of 
Northern production and a greater extent of FDI.  
Although a lower Northern labor supply will shift production from the North to 
the South, which will, in turn, raise the extent of outsourcing, it also has the effect of 
reducing the extent of outsourcing because outsourcing requires Northern labor. The 
former will dominate the latter, such that there will an increase in the extent of 
outsourcing. We summarize the results in the following proposition.20 
Proposition 3. A reduction in the Northern labor supply will result in a corresponding 
reduction in the adjusted level of R&D difficulty, along with a reduction in the extent 
of Northern production and increases in the extents of FDI, outsourcing and Southern 
production. Both the FDI and outsourcing intensities will increase. However, wage 
rates in the North and the South and the proportion of Southern workers being skilled 
will be unaffected.  
4. HETEROGENEOUS NORTHERNERS 
There has been considerable debate on the pros and cons of international production 
for the North. Those advocating such international production argue that it can reduce 
the costs of production, while its opponents argue that it leads to an increase in the 
Northern wage inequality. Despite numerous empirical studies in this field, very few 
theoretical studies have set out to explain the linkage between the two issues. In order to 
address this, we extend our basic model to allow for heterogeneity among Northerners. 
Like Southerners, Northerners can choose to remain unskilled and earn the wage 
rate ݓே௅  or to spend a time period ܦே in school for skills training and receive the 
skilled wage rate		ݓேு on completion of their skills education. Let ߶ே represent the 
proportion of population remaining unskilled in the North. Each Northerner needs to 
                                                 
20 The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in the Appendix B. 
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pay ݃ீ ൐ 0 for tax in every period and we assume that Northern government runs a 
balanced budget. The total Northern public investment in education is ܩேሺݐሻ ൌ
݃ீܮேሺݐሻ, which implies that such investment amounts to ݃ே ൌ ீಿሺ௧ሻሺଵିథಿሻ௅ಿሺ௧ሻ for each 
skilled Northerner. Northerners will choose to receive skills training if: 
														න ݁ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿ
௧ା்
௧
ݓே௅݀߬ ൑ න ݁		ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿݓேு݄ேሺܦேሻ݃ேఊ݀߬
௧ା்
௧ା஽ಿ
	,														ሺ36ሻ 
where the function ݄ேሺܦேሻ ൌ ܣேܦேఉಿ with ܣே ൐ 0 and ߚே ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ.  
The optimal time spent in schools (ܦഥே) is chosen by:  
               ρ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ ൌ ൫1 െ ݁ିఘሺ்ି஽ഥಿሻ൯݄ேᇱ ሺܦഥேሻ.                 (37) 
Wage inequality in the North is therefore: 
								ݓே ൌ ݓே
ு
ݓே௅ ൌ
ߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ
݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ 		,																																						ሺ38ሻ 
where ߪேሺܦഥேሻ ൌ ଵି௘
షഐ೅
௘షഐವഥಿି௘షഐ೅.  
We define ܤேሺܦഥேሻ ൌ ൫݁௚ሺ்ି஽ഥಿሻ െ 1൯/ሺ݁௚் െ 1ሻ. The supply of unskilled labor 
(ܮே௅ ) is therefore: 
                       ܮே௅ ሺݐሻ ൌ ߶ேܮேሺݐሻ,  
and the supply of effective skilled labor (ܮேு ) is: 
                           ܮேுሺݐሻ ൌ ߰ேܮேሺݐሻ, 
where ߰ே ൌ ݄ேሺܦഥேሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊሺ1 െ ߶ேሻଵିఊ. 
Northern unskilled workers are employed in manufacturing of new products, 
whereas Northern skilled workers are engaged in R&D investment and outsourcing 
activities. Thus, Eq. (17) becomes: 
																																																												ߨே ൌ ܧ ቆ1 െ 	ݓே
௅
ߣ ቇ.																																																				ሺ39ሻ 
Note that the instantaneous profit for firms carrying out FDI or outsourcing (Eq. (16)) 
remains the same.  
It should be noted that Eqs. (11)-(13) and (17)-(21) remain unchanged, as do the 
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steady-state conditions in Eqs. (22) to (24) and the labor market clearing conditions for 
the South in Eqs. (26) to (27). The labor market clearing conditions for the skilled and 
unskilled Northern labor are: 
																																																				ܽோߡோݔ ൅ ܽைߡைݔ݊ே ൌ ߰ே ܮேܮௌ .																																												ሺ40ሻ 
																																																																			݊ே ܧ
෠
ߣ ൌ ߶ே
ܮே
ܮௌ .																																																						ሺ41ሻ 
The setting for the South remains the same. As compared with the benchmark 
model in Section 2, we have three new variables ሼݓே௅ , ܦഥே, ߶ேሽ and three more 
equations (Eqs. (37), (38) and one more equation for the Northern labor market).  
As shown in Appendix C, in equilibrium, the extent of FDI (݊ி) can be expressed 
in terms of ݊ௌ, the proportion of Southern population being unskilled (߶ௌ) can be 
expressed as a function of ߶ே while the adjusted expenditure (ܧ෠) can be expressed in 
terms of ߶ே and ݊ௌ. Then the market clearing conditions for Northern and Southern 
unskilled workers become can be expressed by ݊ௌ and ߶ே: 
																																			݊ௌ ൌ ߝߝ ൅ ܽோ ቈ1 െ ݊ிሺ݊ௌሻ െ
ߣ߶ேܮே
ܧ෠ሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻܮௌ቉.																																				ሺ42ሻ 
																																								݊ௌ 	ൌ ߝߣߝ ൅ ܽோ ቈ
ߣ߶ௌሺ߶ேሻ
ܧ෠ሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻ െ ݊ிሺ݊ௌሻ቉.																																								ሺ43ሻ 
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium where Eq. (42) is represented by the NN locus 
and Eq. (43) is represented by SS locus.21 Since stronger IPR protection will shift both 
the NN and SS locus upward, the extent of Southern production increases while the 
change of the fraction of unskilled Northerners is not clear. To conduct numerical 
analysis, we set ߚே ൌ 0.12 which is higher than ߚௌ so that Northerners will spend a 
longer period in schools than Southerners.22 We assign ܣே ൌ 1.32 and ܣௌ ൌ 1, so 
                                                 
21  See Appendix C for the details about deriving the BGP equilibrium and Appendix D for the 
calculations of the slopes of NN and SS locus. 
22  This parameter setting produces ܦே=10.46%, which is higher than ܦௌ=8.87%. 
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that about 24.81% of Northerners and 1.38% of Southerners are skilled workers.23 
This will also generate the result that wage inequality is lower in the North than in the 
South. The remaining parameters are set at the same values as those in the benchmark 
model. The equilibrium values of the key variables are presented in Table 2.  
<Figure 2 is inserted about here> 
Table 2 shows that stronger IPR protection policy raises the extents of 
outsourcing and Southern production while reducing the extents of FDI and Northern 
production. Both the fraction of unskilled Northerners and the wage rate for unskilled 
Northerners will decrease due to the shift of production from the North to the South. 
The higher supply of skilled Northerners will reduce the wage rate for skilled 
Northerners. Overall, wage inequality will be higher in the North. On the other hand, 
an increase in the fraction of unskilled Southerners will reduce wage inequality in the 
South. The international wage dispersion for skilled workers will increase.  
<Table 2 is inserted about here> 
Table 2 also indicates that a reduction in ܽை will cause similar effects on wage 
inequalities for the North and the South and the international wage dispersion for 
skilled workers as those caused by stronger IPR protection.24 However, a reduction in 
the labor intensity for FDI will generate the reversed effects on the wage inequalities 
for the North and the South and the international wage dispersion for skilled workers. 
This is because it increases the demand for Southern skilled workers while reducing 
                                                 
23  The parameterization used by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) guarantees that the proportion of 
the labor force becomes skilled is less than 25% in both developed and developing countries.  
24  The empirical studies of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b) find that the reduction in the wages of 
unskilled workers (and the increase in the relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers) in the 
U.S. during the 1980’s can be explained by the increase in the outsourcing of production activities. On 
the other hand, using the data of 29 developing countries over the period 1982-2000, Khalifa and 
Mengova (2010) show that there exists skill abundance threshold, below which production is outsourced 
to developing countries and the relationship between outsourcing and wage inequality is negative in 
these developing countries. 
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the demand for Northern skilled workers.25 
A decrease in the labor intensity for R&D reduces wage inequality in the North 
and raises the extent of outsourcing since more skilled Northerners are available for 
outsourcing. With more Northerners choosing to become unskilled, the extent of 
Northern production will increase. The increase in the extent of outsourcing leads to a 
reduction in the extent of FDI. The demand for Southern skilled workers is therefore 
reduced, which lowers the wage rate for Southern skilled workers. Therefore, the 
international wage dispersion for skilled workers will increase.  
If there is a decrease in Northern population, there will be a corresponding 
increase in wage inequality in the North, since it raises the wage rate for skilled 
Northerners, while leaving the wage rate for unskilled Northerners unchanged. With 
lower labor resources devoted to production in the North, there will be an increase in 
the extent of FDI, which thereby raises the demand for skilled workers in the South. 
Wage inequality in the South will increase, leaving the international wage dispersion of 
skilled workers unchanged. 
A comparison between Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the effects on adjusted R&D 
difficulty and patterns of production arising from increasing globalization, R&D cost and the 
Northern population, are all similar to those in the benchmark model, with one exception: a 
decrease in the level of Northern population reduces the proportion of Southern unskilled 
workers in the presence of heterogeneous Northern workers.26 
5.  CONCLUSION  
                                                 
25  The empirical study of Aitken et al. (1996) finds that FDI activity is associated with higher wages 
only for foreign-owned firms. The higher levels of FDI will cause a higher relative wage ratio in the 
South. The recent study of Herzer et al. (2012) shows that increase in inward FDI contributes to 
widening income inequality in Latin America economies. 
26  In Appendix E, we perform a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results in Tables 1 
and 2. In particular, we allow ߣ, ߦ, ߛ and ݃ீ to decrease or increase from their benchmark values by 
5%. The results indicate that our main finding that stronger IPR protection in the South is in favor of 
outsourcing over FDI is robust. Furthermore, its effects on wage inequalities and the fraction of 
Southerner (Northerners) being skilled remain the same qualitatively. 
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In this paper, we develop a North-South general-equilibrium model to investigate the 
effects of strengthening IPR protection on innovation, skills choice, wage inequality, 
and patterns of production. Our results illustrate that strengthening IPR protection in 
the South will raise the extents of outsourcing and Southern production, along with 
corresponding reductions in the extents of FDI and Northern production. The Northern 
wage inequality will increase since firms will shift their production from the North to 
the South. The Southern wage inequality will decrease as a result of the increase in the 
demand for Southern unskilled production workers. We also examine the effects of 
increasing globalization, R&D cost and the Northern population. 
We conclude this study with the suggestion that our model can be extended and 
applied to a variety of issues, and by pointing out two specific directions which would 
appear to be ripe for future study. First, in addition to products produced through 
outsourcing, Southern firms can also imitate products produced through FDI or 
products completely produced in the North. Second, the outsourcing contracts could 
also be endogenized. By designing elaborate contracts, Northern firms could avoid the 
loss of profits caused by contract default.
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Figure 1. Adjusted R&D difficulty and Southern production 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Northern skilled labor and Southern production 
 
nS 
x 
SL’ 
NL 
A 
NL’ 
SL 
A’ 
nS 
φN 
NN’ SS 
E 
SS’ 
NN E’ 
 28
 
 
Table 1  Numerical results 
 
Variables Equilibrium Values 
Measures of Exogenous Shifts 
ε down 1% aO down 1% aF down 1% aR down 1% LN down 1% 
Panel A:  Effects on Wage Rates 
wN
H 1.4283 -0.0571 -0.1339 0.0000 0.1343 0.0000 
wS
H 1.1889 -0.3895 -0.9111 1.0101 -0.0877 0.0000 
wH 1.2013 0.3337 0.7844 -1.0000 0.2222 0.0000 
Panel B:  Other Effects 
S 0.9864 0.2450 0.5074 -0.9022 0.0593 0.0000 
x 5.0399 0.0407 0.0279 0.7165 0.5233 -0.5815 
nN 0.4956 -0.0029 0.1997 -0.4314 0.0770 -0.5952 
nF 0.0627 -17.4389 -36.1584 64.1117 -4.7070 0.5849 
nO 0.2955 2.8178 4.9059 -8.6118 0.5814 0.5849 
nS 0.1463 1.7897 4.9059 -8.6118 0.5814 0.5849 
ߡF 0.0026 -17.4365 -36.2857 64.8227 -4.7830 1.1872 
ߡO 0.0180 2.4804 4.6967 -8.2159 0.5040 1.1872 
Note: All figures refer to the percentage changes in the key variables from their benchmark values (presented in column 2) as a result of each exogenous shift. 
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Table 2  Heterogeneous Northerners 
 
Variables Equilibrium Values 
Measures of Exogenous Shifts 
ε down 1% aO down 1% aF down 1% aR down 1% LN down 1% 
Panel A:  Effects on Wage Rates 
wN
H 1.5429 -0.0474 -0.1194 -0.0169 0.1305 0.0104 
wN
L 1.4283 -0.0571 -0.1339 0.0000 0.1343 0.0000 
ݓܰ 1.0802 0.0097 0.0144 -0.0169 -0.0038 0.0104 
wS
H 1.2843 -0.3798 -0.8968 0.9930 -0.0915 0.0104 
wH 1.2013 0.3337 0.7844 -1.0000 0.2222 0.0000 
Panel B:  Other Effects 
N 0.7519 -0.1603 -0.2391 0.2780 0.0632 -0.1722 
S 0.9862 0.2417 0.5059 -0.8914 0.0624 -0.0073 
x 4.6676 0.0337 0.0151 0.7244 0.5246 -0.5860 
nN 0.4958 -0.0042 0.1991 -0.4264 0.0785 -0.5983 
nF 0.0632 -17.0400 -35.6969 62.7441 -4.8871 1.1040 
nO 0.2950 2.7884 4.8948 -8.5176 0.6125 0.5143 
nS 0.1460 1.7605 4.8948 -8.5176 0.6125 0.5143 
ߡF 0.0026 -17.0366 -36.8246 63.4410 -4.9617 1.7125 
ߡO 0.0180 2.4524 4.6864 -8.1258 0.5336 1.1193 
Note: All figures refer to the percentage changes in the key variables from their equilibrium values (presented in column 2) as a result of each exogenous shift. 
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APPENDIX A 
BGP Equilibrium  
First note that ܦഥௌ and ߡோ are respectively determined by Eqs. (7) and (20). Using Eqs. 
(28)-(30), we can derive: 
																																																	ܧ෠ ൌ ݔߣሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽλ െ 1 ,																																				ሺA1ሻ 
																																																	ݓேு ൌ ߣߤ ൅
ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ
ߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ ൐ 1,																																		ሺA2ሻ 
																																																			ݓௌு ൌ ߤሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽி ݓே
ு.																																												ሺA3ሻ 
From Eq. (8), we can compute the proportion of unskilled Southerners:  
																																																					߶ௌ ൌ 1 െ ቈ݄ௌሺܦ
ഥௌሻ݃ீఊݓௌு
ߪௌሺܦഥௌሻ ቉
ଵ
ఊ
,																																									ሺA4ሻ 
where ݓௌு is given by Eq. (A3). 
Combining Eqs.(22) and (26) gives us: 
																																																																			݊ி ൌ ߰ௌܽிߡோݔ 	.																																																									ሺA5ሻ 
Then substitution Eqs. (21), (24), (A1) and (A5) into the market clearing condition of 
Northern labor (Eq. (25)), we can derive Eq. (34):	
																											݊ௌ ൌ
1 െ ߰ௌܽிݔߡோ ൅
ሺߣ െ 1ሻ ቀܽோݔߡோ െ ܮேܮௌ ቁݔሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽ
ߝ ൅ ݅ோߝ െ
ܽைݔߡோሺߡோ ൅ ߝሻሺߣ െ 1ሻߝݔሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽ
		.																																	ሺA6ሻ 
Substitution Eqs. (24), (A1) and (A5) into the market clearing condition of Southern 
unskilled labor (Eq. (27)) gives us Eq. (35):  
																											݊ௌ 	ൌ ߝݔሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ൜
߶ௌሺߣ െ 1ሻ
ߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ െ
߰ௌ
ܽிߡோൠ.																									ሺA7ሻ 
Note that Eq. (34) indicates that ݊ௌ and ݔ are positively correlated while Eq. (35) 
implies that there is a negative relationship between ݊ௌ and ݔ. 
From Eqs. (A6) and (A7), we can derive the unique solution of ݔ:  
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																																					ݔ ൌ
ሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ܮேܮௌ ൅
߰ௌܽி ߠଵ െ ߶ௌߠଶ
ሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ൜ܽோߡோ ൅ ߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோλ െ 1 ൠ
,																						ሺA8ሻ 
where	 ߠଵ ൌ ܽைሺߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ൅ ఌሼఒఓାሾఘାሺଵିకሻఐೃሿ௔ೃሽ௜ೃ 	 and ߠଶ ൌ
௔ೀሺఌା௜ೃሻሺ஛ିଵሻ
ఒఓାሾఘାሺଵିకሻఐೃሿ௔ೃ െ ሺߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ.	
Substituting the solution of ݔ in Eqs. (A7) and (A1), we can get ݊ௌ and ܧ෠. 
Using Eqs. (24), (21), (22) and (23), we can derive ݊ை ൌ ߡோ݊ௌ/ߝ, ݊ே ൌ 1 െ ݊ை െ
݊ி െ ݊ௌ, ߡி ൌ ߡோ݊ி/݊ே and ߡை ൌ ሺߡோ ൅ ߝሻ݊ை/݊ே. Thus, we have completely solved 
the model and showed that there exists a unique solution.  
 
APPENDIX B 
Proof of Proposition 4  
Note that Eqs. (20), (A2), (A3) and (A4) indicate that ߡோ, ݓேு, ݓௌு and ߶ௌ do not 
depend on ܮே. This implies that ݓேு is also independent of ܮே. Using Eq. (A8) to 
differentiate ݔ with respect to ܮே, we obtain: 
																					 ߲ݔ߲ܮே ൌ
ሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ
ܮௌሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ൜ܽோߡோ ൅ ߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோλ െ 1 ൠ
൐ 0.																					ሺB1ሻ	
Eq.	ሺA5ሻ	indicates	that	 	
																																																			 ߲݊ி	߲ܮே ൌ
െ߰ௌ
ܽிߡோݔଶ
߲ݔ
߲ܮே ൏ 0.																																																				ሺB2ሻ	
From	Eq.	ሺA7ሻ,	we	can	get	that	
																		 ߲݊ௌ	߲ܮே ൌ
െߝ
ݔଶሺߣߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ ൜
߶ௌሺߣ െ 1ሻ
ߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ െ
߰ௌ
ܽிߡோൠ
߲ݔ
߲ܮே ൏ 0.														ሺB3ሻ	
Then	 	
																																																											߲݊ை	߲ܮே ൌ
ߡோ
ε
߲݊ௌ
	߲ܮே ൏ 0.																																																					ሺB4ሻ	
Eqs.	ሺB2ሻ‐ሺB4ሻ	implies	that:	
																																														߲݊ே߲ܮே ൌ െ൬
߲݊ி
	߲ܮே ൅
߲݊ௌ
	߲ܮே ൅
߲݊ை
	߲ܮே൰ ൐ 0.																																	ሺB5ሻ	
Differentiating ߡி and ߡை with respect to ܮே, we have: 
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																																														 ߲ߡி߲ܮே ൌ
ߡோ
݊ேଶ ൬݊ே
߲݊ி
	߲ܮே െ ݊ி
߲݊ே
߲ܮே൰ ൏ 0.																																	ሺB6ሻ	
																																											 ߲ߡை߲ܮே ൌ
ߡோ ൅ ߝ
݊ேଶ ൬݊ே
߲݊ை
	߲ܮே െ ݊ை
߲݊ே
߲ܮே൰ ൏ 0.																															ሺB7ሻ	
Eqs. (B1)-(B7) indicate that a decrease in ܮே lowers ݔ and ݊ே, and raises ݊ி, 
݊ை, ݊ௌ, ߡி and ߡை. 	
 
APPENDIX C 
Equilibrium of the Model of Heterogeneous Northerners 
First note that ܦഥே is determined by Eq. (37). Substituting Eqs. (11)-(13), (16) and (39) 
into Eqs. (17)-(19), we have: 
																																																ܧ෠ ቆ1 െ ݓே
௅
ߣ ቇ ൌ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿݓே
ுܽோݔ,																												ሺC1ሻ	
																																															ܧ෠ߣ ሺݓே
௅ െ 1ሻ ൌ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿݓௌுܽிݔ,																														ሺC2ሻ	
																																																											ܧ෠ߣ ሺݓே
௅ െ 1ሻ ൌ ߤݓேுݔ.																																																	ሺC3ሻ	
Note that ߡோ is solved by Eq. (20). Using Eqs. (C1)-(C3), we can further derive: 
																																																		ݓேு ൌ 		ܧ
෠ሺλ െ 1ሻ
ݔߣሼߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽ,																																		ሺC4ሻ 
																																																						ݓே௅ ൌ ߣߤ ൅
ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ
ߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோ ,																																						ሺC5ሻ 
																																																										ݓௌு ൌ ߤሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽி ݓே
ு.																																					ሺC6ሻ 
Combining Eqs. (8), (38) and (C6), we can express ߶ௌ as a function of 	߶ே: 
																																																						߶ௌሺ߶ேሻ ൌ 1 െ ߁ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻ,																																												ሺC7ሻ 
where ߁ ൌ ቄ ఙಿሺ஽ഥಿሻఓ௪ಽಿ௛ೄሺ஽ഥೄሻఙೄሺ஽ഥೄሻሾఘାሺଵିకሻఐೃሿ௔ಷ௛ಿሺ஽ഥಿሻቅ
భ
ം
. 
The steady-state conditions in Eqs. (22) to (24) remain unchanged, as do the labor 
market clearing conditions for the South in Eqs. (26) to (27). From Eq. (40), we can 
express ݔ as a function of ߶ே and ݊ௌ: 
																																									ݔሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻ ൌ ߝ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܮேሾߝܽோ ൅ ܽைሺߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ݊ௌሿߡோܮௌ .																																ሺC8ሻ 
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Using Eqs. (38), (C5) and (C8), we can express ܧ෠ in terms of ߶ே and ݊ௌ: 
												ܧ෠ሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻ ൌ ߪேሺܦ
ഥேሻݔሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ
ሺλ െ 1ሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ .											ሺC9ሻ 
Eqs. (C4), (C.5) and (C9) imply that the Northern wage inequality can be represented 
as a function of ߶ே and ݊ௌ:  
																																				ݓேሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻ ൌ 			ܧ
෠ሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻሺλ െ 1ሻ
ݔߣሼߣߤ ൅ ሾߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߦሻߡோሿܽோሽ.																										ሺC10ሻ 
Combining Eqs. (22), (26) and (C10) and definitions of ߰ே and ߰ௌ, we can 
derive ݊ி as a function of ݊ௌ: 
																								݊ிሺ݊ௌሻ ൌ ሾߝܽோ ൅ ܽைሺߝ ൅ ݅ோሻ݊ௌሿߡோܮௌ݄ௌሺܦ
ഥௌሻܤௌሺܦഥௌሻΓଵିఊ
ߝܽிߡோܮே݄ேሺܦഥேሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ .																		ሺC11ሻ 
Substituting Eqs. (21), (24), (C9) and (C11) into labor market clearing conditions 
for unskilled Northerners and Southerners (Eqs. (41) and (27)), we have: 
																																݊ௌ ൌ ߝߝ ൅ ܽோ ቈ1 െ ݊ிሺ݊ௌሻ െ
ߣ߶ேܮே
ܧ෠ሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻܮௌ቉.																																ሺC12ሻ 
																																					݊ௌ 	ൌ ߝߣߝ ൅ ܽோ ቈ
ߣ߶ௌሺ߶ேሻ
ܧ෠ሺ߶ே, ݊ௌሻ െ ݊ிሺ݊ௌሻ቉.																																					ሺC13ሻ 
Note that Eq. (C12) shows that ߶ே and ݊ௌ are negatively correlated while Eq. 
(C13) implies that ߶ே and ݊ௌ are positively correlated. The equilibrium ߶ே and ݊ௌ 
can be derived by using Eqs. (C12) and (C13). Therefore, substituting the ߶ே and ݊ௌ 
into Eqs. (C4)-(C10), we can compute ݓேு, ݓே௅ , ݓௌு,	ݓே, ܧ෠, ߶ௌ and ݔ. Using Eqs. 
(24), (21), (22) and (23), we can derive ݊ை ൌ ߡோ݊ௌ/ߝ , ݊ே ൌ 1 െ ݊ை െ ݊ி െ ݊ௌ , 
ߡி ൌ ߡோ݊ி/݊ே and ߡை ൌ ሺߡோ ൅ ߝሻ݊ை/݊ே. Thus, we have completely solved the model 
and showed that there exists a unique solution.  
 
APPENDIX D 
Slopes of NN and SS locus 
Substituting Eqs. (C7)-(C9), and (C11) and the definition of ߰ே into Eq. (C12), we 
have: 
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											݊ௌ ൌ
ߙଶሺ1 െ ߙଵߝܽோ݅ோሻ െ ߝܽோ݅ோ ߶ேܮேሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܮௌ
߶ேܮேሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܮௌ ܽைሺߝ ൅ ߡோሻߡோ ൅ ߙଶ ቂߙଵܽைሺߝ ൅ ߡோሻߡோ ൅ 1 ൅
ߡோߝ ቃ
,																		ሺD1ሻ	 
where ߙଵ ൌ ௅ೄ௛ೄሺ஽ഥೄሻ஻ೄሺ஽ഥೄሻ௰
భషം
௅ಿ௔ಷఌఐೃ௛ಿሺ஽ഥಿሻ஻ಿሺ஽ഥಿሻ and ߙଶ ൌ
௅ಿఌ஻ಿሺ஽ഥಿሻఙಿሺ஽ഥಿሻሼఒఓାሾఘାሺଵିకሻఐೃሿ௔ೃሽ
௅ೄሺ஛ିଵሻ .  
Using Eq. (D1), we can obtain ݀݊ௌ ݀߶ே⁄ ൏ 0. This implies that ݊ௌ and ߶ே are 
negatively correlated from the perspective of the market clearing condition for 
Northern unskilled labor. 
Substituting Eqs. (C7)-(C9) and (C11) into Eq. (C13), we have: 
݊ௌ ൌ ߝܽோ݅ோሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻሺ߁ ൅ ߙଵߙଶሻሿሺ1 െ ߶ேሻ ቄߙଶ ቂߙଵܽைሺߝ ൅ ߡோሻߡோ ൅ ߣ ൅ ߡோߝ ቃ ൅ ߁ܽைሺߝ ൅ ߡோሻߡோቅെܽைሺߝ ൅ ߡோሻߡோ
. ሺD2ሻ 
From Eq. (D2), we can obtain ݀݊ௌ ݀߶ே⁄ ൐ 0. This implies that ݊ௌ and ߶ே are 
positively correlated from the perspective of the market clearing condition for 
Southern unskilled labor. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Table E1  Sensitivity analysis: homogeneous Northerners 
 
Variables 
Benchmark 
Model  
                            Effects of stronger IPR protection (ߝ decreases 1%)    
ߣ down 5% ߣ up 5% ߦ down 5% ߦ up 5% ߛ down 5% ߛ up 5% ݃ீdown 5% ݃ீ up 5% 
Panel A:  Effects on Wage Rates    
wN
H  -0.0571 -0.0530 -0.0610 -0.0564 -0.0578 -0.0571 -0.0571 -0.0571 -0.0571 
wS
H -0.3895 -0.3854 -0.3934 -0.3850 -0.3937 -0.3895 -0.3895 -0.3895 -0.3895 
wH 0.3337 0.3337 0.3337 0.3298 0.3373 0.3337 0.3337 0.3337 0.3337 
Panel B:  Other Effects    
S 0.2450 0.0524 1.1359 0.1720 0.3408 0.2031 0.2898 0.2326 0.2574 
x 0.0407 0.1893 -0.5875 0.1046 -0.0499 0.0740 0.0054 0.0505 0.0308 
nN -0.0029 -0.0913 0.4033 -0.0552 0.0722 -0.0242 0.0196 -0.0091 0.0033 
nF -17.4389 -17.3947 -17.0751 -17.3077 -17.5342 -18.3097 -16.6388 -17.4470 -17.4308 
nO 2.8178 0.9609 15.3343 2.0066 3.9951 2.3765 3.3139 2.6874 2.9497 
nS 1.7897 -0.0487 14.1809 0.9866 2.9552 1.3527 2.2807 1.6606 1.9202 
ߡF -17.4365 -17.3192 -17.4083 -17.2620 -17.5937 -18.2899 -16.6552 -17.4395 -17.4335 
ߡO 2.4804 0.7185 14.4906 1.7365 3.5647 2.0621 2.952 2.3567 2.6055 
Note: All figures refer to the percentage changes in the key variables from their equilibrium values as a result of stronger IPR protection. 
 
  
 36
 
Table E2  Sensitivity analysis: heterogeneous Northerners 
 
Variables 
Benchmark 
Model ) 
                            Effects of stronger IPR protection (ߝ decreases 1%)    
ߣ down 5% ߣ up 5% ߦ down 5% ߦ up 5% ߛ down 5% ߛ up 5% ݃ீdown 5% ݃ீ up 5% 
Panel A:  Effects on Wage Rates    
wN
H -0.0474 -0.0468 -0.0385 -0.0479 -0.0466 -0.0483 -0.0465 -0.0474 -0.0474 
wN
L -0.0571 -0.0530 -0.0610 -0.0564 -0.0577 -0.0571 -0.0571 -0.0571 -0.0571 
ݓே 0.0097 0.0062 0.0225 0.0085 0.0111 0.0088 0.0106 0.0097 0.0097 
wS
H -0.3798 -0.3792 -0.3709 -0.3765 -0.3826 -0.3807 -0.3789 -0.3798 -0.3798 
wH 0.3337 0.3337 0.3337 0.3298 0.3373 0.3337 0.3337 0.3337 0.3337 
Panel B:  Other Effects    
N -0.1603 -0.0966 -0.3768 -0.1486 -0.1741 -0.1537 -0.1667 -0.1603 -0.1603 
S 0.2417 0.0499 1.0955 0.1773 0.3220 0.2179 0.2648 0.2417 0.2417 
x 0.0337 0.1852 -0.5793 0.0923 -0.0450 0.0535 0.0146 0.0337 0.0337 
nN -0.0042 -0.0923 0.3853 -0.0526 0.0619 -0.0164 0.0076 -0.0042 -0.0042 
nF -17.0400 -17.1404 -16.1625 -16.9517 -17.0888 -17.9206 -16.2333 -17.0400 -17.0400 
nO 2.7884 0.9363 14.9516 2.0594 3.7846 2.5311 3.0474 2.7884 2.7884 
nS 1.7605 -0.0730 13.8021 1.0388 2.7468 1.5057 2.0169 1.7605 1.7605 
ߡF -17.0366 -17.0638 -16.4842 -16.9080 -17.1401 -17.9071 -16.2396 -17.0366 -17.0366 
ߡO 2.4524 0.6951 14.1314 1.7865 3.3657 2.2083 2.6984 2.4524 2.4524 
Note: All figures refer to the percentage changes in the key variables from their equilibrium values as a result of stronger IPR protection. 
 
